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Is it possible to be altruistic in the face of altruism? With a naive defini-
tion of altruism, the answer is no. If an altruistic consumer is defined to be one
whose preferences over allocations satisfy an appropriate interdependence condi-
tion, then the answer is yes. However, altruism in the face of malice is impossible.
One of our findings is that if two consumers are mutually altruistic, exactly one of
them should adopt selfish preferences over allocations.
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1. Introduction
In a naive approach to the concept of altruism, altruism is defined in terms of pref-
erences over allocations of a single good to a group of consumers. This naive approach
is subject to the following paradox. Suppose a single good is to be allocated to two con-
sumers. Consumer 1 says “I am extremely altruistic. When faced with two allocations that
assign different amounts to consumer 2, I always prefer the allocation that gives her more”.
The paradox arises if consumer 2 also claims to be altruistic and declares her preferences
for allocations that assign more to consumer 1. This reduces consumer 1’s altruism to
an exercise in self denial; for example, consumer 1 would choose the allocation (6,4) over
(9,2), since it assigns more of the good to consumer 2, but in doing so she would not be
choosing consumer 2’s preferred allocation, (9,2).
In an interdependence approach to altruism, consumer 1 expresses altruism (or self-
interest, or malice) by adopting not a preference relation over allocations, but an inter-
dependence condition on preference relations. For example, to express extreme altruism
consumer 1 might claim to prefer allocations preferred by consumer 2, and might add
that when consumer 2 is indifferent between two allocations he (consumer 1) prefers the
allocation that assigns him more of the good. Then no matter what preference relation
over allocations is adopted by consumer 2, consumer 1 can try to find a preference relation
tailor-made to please consumer 2. One of our goals is to show that with the interdependent
preferences approach, mutual altruism is possible. We begin our study of interdependent
preferences with a brief discussion of interdependent utility functions.
An interdependent condition on utilities is a statement that defines a consumer’s
happiness in terms of her level of consumption and the happiness levels of her counterparts.
Bergstrom (2000) addresses the following problem: find utility functions over allocations
that satisfy a given system of interdependence conditions. In solving such a problem one
unravels a mare’s nest of interrelated claims of altruism, self-interest and malice to arrive
at a collection of utility functions over allocations.
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Bergstrom started with the following two-consumer system of interdependence condi-
tions on utility functions:
U1(x) = u1(x1) + a1U2(x) (1)
U2(x) = u2(x2) + a2U1(x) (2)
Here x = (x1, x2) is an allocation of a single good to two consumers; xi ≥ 0 is the amount
allocated to consumer i for her consumption; ui(xi) is the utility derived by consumer i
from the consumption of xi units of the good; ai ∈ + is a measure of caring or altruism
(or malice if ai < 0); and Ui : + × + →  is a utility function over allocations.
Bergstrom solved the problem, gave a thorough interpretation of the solutions, and then
generalized both problem and solution, first to any finite number of consumers, then to
countably many consumers.
We will generalize the system (1), (2) in a different direction. We show how to formu-
late interdependence conditions for two consumers without the restrictive assumption that
the consumers’ preferences are represented by utility functions. When the two consumers’
preferences are not representable by utility functions, multiplication and addition cannot
be used to express a relationship between preferences as in (1) and (2). Instead in Section
2 we show how to combine preference relations using the lexicographic order and Pareto
dominance: This enables us to formulate three interdependence conditions that cannot be
represented by the system (1) and (2): maximal altruism, minimal altruism and unanimity.
We also show that under fairly weak assumptions called ordinality, minimal self-interest,
minimal altruism and minimal indifference, there are no other interdependence conditions
than the three we have constructed. The resulting nine systems of interdependence con-
ditions for two consumers are solved in Section 3. A solution of a two-consumer system
of interdependence conditions is a pair of preference relations over allocations that satisfy
that system. The solutions are interpreted in Section 4. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks. Uniqueness of solutions is discussed in the appendix.
Interdependence preferences appeared first in overlapping generation models, where
a consumer’s utility depends not only on his own level of consumption but also on the
consumption levels of his descendents. See Barro (1974) for an early example. A more
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recent use of interdependent preferences is in evolutionary game theory. For example,
Bester and Guth (1988) investigate the evolutionary stability of altruism. Kockesen, Ok
and Sethi (2000) do the same for malicious or spiteful preferences. Experimental economists
have also taken an interest in interdependent preferences. Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidle
(1993) study fairness in markets. Andreoni and Miller (1999) conduct a revealed preference
test of the consistency of altruism.
Previous studies have labored under one or both of the following restrictions. First,
interdependence conditions have allowed a consumer’s preferences over allocations to de-
pend on his own consumption and the consumption of others but not on the preferences
of others. Second, only preference relations representable by utility functions have been
considered. Dropping both of these assumptions, we will produce a template that allows
economists to create their own definitions of words like “altruism”, “selfish” and “ma-
licious,” and to find context-appropriate answers to questions of the form “Is altruism
possible?”
2. Interdependence Without Utility
A binary relation B on a set X is a subset of X × X . For (x, y) ∈ B we will write
xBy. A binary relation is asymmetric if xBy implies not(yBx). A preference relation is
an asymmetric binary relation. If  is a preference relation over X and x, y ∈ X , then
x∼y if not(y  x), x ∼ y if x∼y∼x and x ≺ y if y  x.
Suppose there are two consumers and two allocations a = (a1, a2) and b = (b1, b2)
where consumer 1 consumes a1 under allocation a and consumer 2 consumes a2 under a
while 1 consumes b1 under b and 2 consumes b2 under allocation b.
Define preference relations >1, >2, L, RL, and PD over + ×+ as follows:
a >1 b if a1 > b1
a >2 b if a2 > b2
a L b if a1 > b1 or (a1 = b1 and a2 > b2)
a RL b if a2 > b2 or (a2 = b2 and a1 > b1)
a PD b if a1 ≥ b1, a2 ≥ b2 and a = b.
4
Here L stands for lexicographic, RL for reverse lexicographic and PD for Pareto
dominant.
Next we show how to combine preference relations using the lexicographic order and
Pareto dominance. If A and B are preference relations over X , define preference rela-
tions L(A, B) over X and PD(A, B) over X by
a L(A,B) b if a A b or (a ∼A b and a B b)
a PD(A ,B)b if a∼Ab, a∼Bb and (a A b or a B b).
We can now formulate three interdependence conditions on a consumer i preference
relation over + × +, the set of allocations of a good to two consumers.
maximal altruism : i= L(j , >i) (3)
minimal altruism : i= L(>i,j) (4)
unanimity : i= PD(>i,j) (5)
where j is consumer j’s preference relation over allocations, j = i.
In words, maximally altruistic consumer i prefers allocation a to allocation b if her
counterpart prefers a, or if her counterpart is indifferent and a assigns i more of the good
than allocation b does. Unanimity focused consumer i prefers allocation a to allocation b
if her counterpart prefers a and a provides at least as much of the good to i as b does, or
if her counterpart is indifferent and a assigns more of the good to i than b does.
Maximal altruism, (3), describes the behavior in the limit as a1 → +∞ of a consumer
whose preferences satisfy interdependence condition (1). For no combination of a1 and
u1 does (1) capture this idea of the behavior in the limit of (1) as a1 → +∞; setting
u1 ≡ 0 goes beyond the limit in that it leaves consumer 1 completely uninterested in
her own consumption, while (3) preserves a minimal interest by consumer i in her own
consumption.
Similarly, minimal altruism, (4), describes the behavior in the limit as a1 → 0 of a
consumer whose preferences satisfy (1). Setting a1 = 0 goes beyond the limit in that it
leaves consumer 1 completely indifferent to the happiness of others.
There is no relationship between (1) and (5), unanimity.
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Why choose for consideration the interdependence conditions (3), (4) and (5)? Clearly
the set of all interdependence conditions is too broad a set to work with, so we make these
simplifying assumptions:
A1. (ordinality) Consumer i decides whether a i b based on the answer to two questions:
Is ai greater than, equal to or less than bi? Does consumer j prefer a, b or neither?
A2. (minimal self interest) a i b if a∼ jb and ai > bi.
A3. (minimal altruism) a i b if ai ≥ bi and a j b.
A4. (minimal indifference) a ∼i b if a ∼j b and ai = bi.
These fairly weak assumptions are enough to narrow our focus to (3), (4) and (5):
Proposition 1. If consumer i’s interdependence condition satisfies A1, A2, A3 and A4,
then consumer i’s interdependence condition is either (3), (4) or (5).
Proof. Suppose consumer i’s interdependence condition which we will call (∗) satisfies A1,
A2, A3 and A4.
By A1, (∗) implies one of the following:
case 1. a i b for all a, b such that a j b and ai < bi.
case 2. b i a for all a, b such that a j b and ai < bi.
case 3. a ∼i b for all a, b such that a j b and ai < bi.
If case 1 holds, then by A2, A3 and A4, (∗) tells us that a i b if and only if (a∼ jb and
ai > bi) or (ai ≥ bi and a j b) or (a j b and ai < bi) if and only if (a j b or ( a ∼j b
and ai > bi)) if and only if aL(j, >i) b. Therefore (∗)=(3). If case 2 holds, then by A2,
A3, and A4, (∗) tells us that a i b if and only if (a∼ jb and ai > bi) or (ai ≥ bi and
a j b) or (ai > bi and b j a) if and only if (ai > bi or (ai = bi and a j b)) if and
only if aL(>i,j) b. Therefore (∗)= (4). If case 3 holds, then by A2, A3, and A4, (∗)
tells us that a i b if and only if (a∼ jb and ai > bi) or (ai ≥ bi and a j b) if and only if
aPD(>i,j) b. Therefore (∗)=(5).
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Before proceeding, we should reiterate that the general method of construction used
to form (3), (4) and (5) does, as promised in the introduction, generalize the concept of
interdependence conditions on utility functions. In particular, to see that (1), U1(x) =
u1(x1) + a1U2(x) can be written in the form 1= P (A,B), let 1 be the preference
relation on +×+ represented by U1(x); for preference relations A and B on +×+
represented by UA(x) and UB(x) respectively, let P (A,B) be the preference relation on
+ × + represented by UA(x) + UB(x); and let UA(x) = u1(x1) and UB(x) = a1U2(x).
3. Systems of Interdependence Conditions and Solutions.
We form nine systems of interdependence conditions using (3), (4) and (5) and then
list all solutions from among the following candidate solutions each of which is an ordered
pair of preference relations over allocations. (L,L), (L,RL), (L,PD), (RL,L),
(RL,RL), (RL,PD), (PD,L), (PD,RL), (PD,PD).
Then we show by example how the nine problems were solved.
Problem 1: 1= L(>1,2) (6)
2= L(>2,1) (7)
Solution: (L,RL)
Problem 2: 1= L(>1,2) (8)
2= L(1, >2) (9)
Solution: (L,L)
Problem 3: 1= L(>1,2) (10)
2= PD(>2,1) (11)
Solution: (L,PD)




Problem 5: 1= L(2, >1) (14)
2= L(1, >2) (15)
Solutions: (L,L) and (RL,RL)
Problem 6: 1= L(2, >1) (16)
2= PD(>2,1) (17)
Solutions: (L,PD) and (RL,RL)
Problem 7: 1= PD(>1,2) (18)
2= L(>2,1) (19)
Solution: (PD,RL)
Problem 8: 1= PD(>1,2) (20)
2= L(1, >2) (21)
Solutions: (L,L) and (PD,RL)
Problem 9: 1= PD(>1,2) (22)
2= PD(>2,1) (23)
Solutions: (L,PD) and (PD,RL)
Table 1 illustrates a straightforward way to solve problems 1-9. Table 1 demonstrates
that (L,PD) is a solution of problem 9. Columns 1and 2 list nine cases relating a and
b. Column 3 shows how a and b are related by L for each case. For instance, row three of
column three says that if a1 > b1 and a2 < b2 then a L b. Similarly , column four shows
how a and b are related by PD. For instance, row three of column 4 says if a1 > b1 and
a2 < b2, then a ∼PD b. Then column 5 shows how a and b are related by PD(>1,2).
For instance, row three tells us that if a1 > b1 and a2 < b2, then a1 > b1 and a ∼2 b
(column 4) so that aPD(>1,2) b. Similarly column 6 combines columns 2 and 3 to show
how a and b are related by PD(>2,1). Finally since columns 3 and 5 are identical, (22)
is satisfied when 1= L and 2= PD, and since columns 4 and 6 are identical, (23) is
satisfied when 1= L and 2= PD.
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To show for example that (PD,PD) is not a solution to Problem 9, one would fill
in columns 3 and 4 with 1=PD and 2=PD, then fill in columns 5 and 6. One would
then find that it is not the case that column 3 is identical to column 5 and column 4 is
identical to column 6.
Using this straightforward approach one would need to fill out 81 tables to solve the
9 problems, since there are 9 candidate solutions. However, careful bookkeeping to avoid
duplication of effort reduces the work by about 90 per cent.
[Table 1 here]
4. Solutions Considered.
We will discuss three of the above problems. Problem 5, 1= L(2, >1) and 2=
L(1, >2), was seen to have the solutions (L,L) and (RL,RL). In order for both
consumers to be altruistic, exactly one of them must hold selfish preferences over alloca-
tions. One way both consumers can adopt L is through conscious coordination. Another
is if consumer 1 is altruistic, consumer 2 is altruistic, consumer 2 believes consumer 1 is
selfish, and the second and the third of these facts are common knowledge. Then consumer
2 believes the context is Problem 2 whose only solution is (L,L). Consumer 1 knows
the context is really Problem 5 and that consumer 2 will hold preferences L, so consumer
1 also adopts L.
Problem 6, 1= L(2, >1) and 2= PD(>2,1) was seen to have solutions
(L,PD) and (RL,RL). Again exactly one consumer must hold selfish preferences
over allocations, preferences that are seemingly at odds with his or her interdependence
claim. The solutions as a pair display an odd sort of asymmetry: in one solution the
consumers hold identical preferences over allocations, in the other they don’t.
Problem 9, 1= PD(>1,2) and 2= PD(>2,1), was seen to have solutions
(L,PD) and (PD,RL). The lexicographic preferences over allocations have seemingly
appeared from nowhere.
Note that (L,RL) is a solution to one problem, (L,L) is a solution to three
problems and (RL,L) is a solution to no problems.
9
The results of Section 3 provide the following answer to the question, “Is altruism
possible?”.
Proposition 2. Altruism is possible for consumer i if consumer j’s interdependence con-
dition satisfies assumptions A1 (ordinality), A2 (minimal self interest), A3 (minimal altru-
ism) and A4 (minimal indifference).
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume i = 1. If consumer 2’s interdependence condition
satisfies A1, A2, A3 and A4 then by Proposition 1, it is either (3), (4) or (5). Therefore,
asking if altruism is possible for consumer 1 is equivalent to asking whether problems 4, 5
and 6 have solutions. The answer to this question was seen to be yes in Section 3.
However, altruism is not possible in the face of malice:
Problem 10: 1= L(2, >1) (24)
2= L(≺1, >2) (25)
Now suppose (1,2) is a solution of Problem 10, a, b ∈ + × + and a2 > b2. if
a 1 b, then by (25) b 2 a so that by (24) b 1 a, a contradiction. Similarly b 1 a
leads to a contradiction. If a ∼1 b, then, using a2 > b2, by (25) a 2 b so that by (24)
a 1 b a contradiction. In every case the assumption that (1,2) is a solution leads to a
contradiction.
5. Concluding Remarks.
Interdependent preferences can be used to provide formal definitions for terms that
describe consumer behavior, terms like “altruistic,” “selfish” and “malicious.” For exam-
ple, we defined an altruistic consumer to be one who, when he knows the preferences over
allocations of others, adopts preferences over allocations that satisfy (3). An alternative
definition could replace (3) by (1) with large a1 or with u1 ≡ 0.
The question of feasibility of a given behavior can then be answered formally as follows.
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Given n consumers, a collection C of interdependence conditions and a set S of preference
relations over allocations, a certain behavior is possible or feasible if whenever consumer
1 chooses the interdependence condition defining that behavior and all other consumers
choose interdependence conditions from C, there is a solution, an n-tuple of preference
relations over allocations from S that satisfy the chosen system. For example, we showed
that altruism is possible when n = 2 in the sense that every system of interdependence
conditions chosen from C = {(3), (4), (5)}, where consumer 1 chooses (3) has a solution,
an ordered pair of preference relations over allocations chosen from S = {L,RL,PD}
that satisfies the chosen system.
However, we also showed that altruism in the face of malice is impossible; that is,
altruism is impossible when n = 2 and C contains the condition i= L(≺j , >i).
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Appendix
We will show that for 3 of the 9 problems solved above, the solution given in Section
3 is the unique solution, while for 6 of the 9 problems there are solutions other than those
given; that is, there are solutions where at least one of the two consumers holds preferences
over allocations other than L, RL and PD.
Proposition 3. (L,RL) is the unique pair of preference relations solving Problem 1,
minimal altruism.
Proof: Suppose (1,2) is a solution to Problem 1. By (6) a 1 b if a1 > b1. By (7), a 2 b
if a2 > b2. Therefore by (6) a 1 b if a1 = b1 and a2 > b2. If a = b then a ∼1 b since 1 is
asymmetric. Therefore 1= L. Similarly, 2= RL
For Problem 2, consumer one minimally altruistic and consumer 2 maximally altruis-
tic, (L,L) is not the unique solution. For example, (L(>1, <2), L(>1, <2)), where con-
sumer 1 adopts selfish preferences with a malicious twist and consumer 2 adopts altrusitic
preferences with a masochistic twist, is also a solution of Problem 2. That (L(>1, <2),
L(>1, <2)) is a solution to Problem 2 as well as Problems 5 and 8 is easily checked using
tables like Table 1.
Proposition 4. (L,PD) is the unique pair of preference relations solving Problem 3,
consumer 1 minimally altruistic and consumer 2 unanimity focused.
Proof: Suppose (1,2) is a pair of preference relations solving Problem 3. By (10) if
a1 > b1 then a 1 b. Therefore by (11) if a1 > b1 and a2 ≥ b2 then a 2 b. By (11) if
a1 > b1 and a2 < b2 then a ∼2 b.
Suppose a1 = b1, a2 > b2 and a ≺1 b. Then by (11) a ∼2 b so that by (10) a ∼1 b, a
contradiction.
Suppose a1 = b1, a2 > b2 and a ∼1 b. Then by (11), a 2 b so that by (10), a 1 b, a
contradiction.
Therefore if a1 = b1 and a2 > b2, then a 1 b and by (11) a 2 b.
Lastly, if a = b then a ∼1 b and a ∼2 b since 1 and 2 are asymmetric.
Combining the above facts, (1,2) = (L,PD).
By considerations of symmetry, the question of uniqueness has been answered for
Problems 1-8.
Finally, (L,PD) and (PD,RL) are not the only pair of preference relations that
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solve problem 9. For example, define 1 and 2 by
a 1 b if a1 ≥ b1, a2 ≥ b2 and a = b
or if a1 > b1, a2 < b2 and a1 ≥ 0
(26)
a 2 b if a1 ≥ b1, a2 ≥ b2 and a = b
or if a1 < b1, a2 > b2 and b1 < 0
(27)
Then (1,2) is between the two solutions (L,PD) and (PD,RL) in the sense that
PD ⊆1⊆L and PD ⊆2⊆RL (recall that a preference relation over + × + is
a subset of (+ × +)× (+ × +)).
To verify that (1,2) is a solution to Problem 9, one constructs a table like Table
1. However, this table would have eleven rows rather than 9, since each of the two rows in
Table 1 beginning a1 > b1, a2 < b2 and a1 < b1, a2 > b2 must be divided into two rows.
For example the row that begins a1 > b1, a2 < b2 becomes the two rows in Table 2.
[Table 2. Here]
It is obvious that all preference relations in this paper before 1 and 2 of (26) and
(27) have been transitive.
Proposition 5. 1 and 2 defined in (26) and (27) are transitive.
Proof. Suppose a 1 b 1 c. Then a1 ≥ b1 ≥ c1.
Case 1. a1 = c1. Then a1 = b1 = c1. Therefore, a2 > b2 > c2 so that a2 > c2 which implies
a 1 c.
Case 2. a1 > c1.
Case 2a. a2 ≥ c2. Then a 1 c.
Case 2b. a2 < c2. Then a2 < b2 or b2 < c2. If a2 < b2 then a1 > b1 and a1 ≥ 0. If
b2 < c2, then b1 > c1 and b1 ≥ 0 which implies a1 ≥ 0. Since a1 > c1, a2 < c2 and
a1 ≥ 0, a 1 c.
Therefore 1 is transitive.
Suppose a 2 b 2 c. Then a2 ≥ b2 ≥ c2.
Case 1. a2 = c2. Then a2 = b2 = c2. Therefore, a1 > b1 > c1 so that a1 > c1 which implies
a 2 c.
Case 2. a2 > c2.
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Case 2a. a1 ≥ c1. Then a 2 c.
Case 2b. a1 < c1. Then either b1 < c1 or b1 ≥ c1. If b1 < c1, then b2 > c2 and c1 < 0.
If b1 ≥ c1, then b1 > a1 so that a2 > b2 and b1 < 0. Therefore, c1 < 0. Since a2 > c2,
a1 < c1 and c1 < 0, a 2 c.
Therefore 2 is transitive.
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Table 1
1=L 2=PD PD(>1,2) PD(>2,1)
a1 > b1 a2 > b2    
a1 > b1 a2 = b2    
a1 > b1 a2 < b2  ∼  ∼
a1 = b1 a2 > b2    
a1 = b1 a2 = b2 ∼ ∼ ∼ ∼
a1 = b1 a2 < b2 ≺ ≺ ≺ ≺
a1 < b1 a2 > b2 ≺ ∼ ≺ ∼
a1 < b1 a2 = b2 ≺ ≺ ≺ ≺
a1 < b1 a2 < b2 ≺ ≺ ≺ ≺
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Table 2
1 2 PD(>1,2) PD(>2,1)
a1 > b1 a2 < b2 a1 ≥ 0  ∼  ∼
a1 > b1 a2 < b2 a1 < 0 ∼ ≺ ∼ ≺
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